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BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION
Trevor Potter*
Marianne H. Viray**
Despite the nation's founding commitment to participatory democracy, many bar-
riers to candidate and public participation in the electoral process are damaging
the public's confidence that our elections are fair and open to full participation by
candidates and voters.
The nominating processes created by the two major parties mainly serve the goals
of party "insiders" and the more politically extreme factions, at the expense of com-
petition and public confidence in the two-party system. At the same time, barriers
to minor party and independent candidates-closed primaries, excessive early-
voter registration requirements and complicated state primary and general ballot
access requirements-operate to foreclose the possibility of a meaningful multi-
party system.
This Article will evaluate these and other legal and political barriers, and discuss
the cost that such practices impose upon the nation's civic life.
INTRODUCTION
While the United States is committed in theory to maximizing
public participation in elections, it has long been accepted that
states must necessarily regulate elections, even through restricting
candidate access to the ballot.' With regard to potential candidates
for office, for example, the Supreme Court has reasoned that:
* President and General Counsel, The Campaign Legal Center; former Commis-
sioner and Chairman, Federal Election Commission. B.A. 1978, Harvard College;J.D. 1982,
University of Virginia School of Law.
** Managing Director, The Campaign Legal Center. B.A. 1996, Brigham Young
University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mark Glaze, Amity Clausen,
Jason Davis, James Athas, Lana Price, Micheal Thorpe, Rebecca McAdams, Melissa Barnson
and Ashley Facio, of the Campaign Legal Center.
1. It is often argued that governmental regulation is necessary in order to maintain
political stability. In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court stated its
agreement "with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism
may do significant damage to the fabric of government." Id. at 736. The Court reiterated this
standard in Timmors v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), where it ruled that
the need for political stability allows the state to create "reasonable election regulations that
may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party system ... and that temper the destabilizing
effects of party splintering and excessive factionalism." Id. at 367.
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A procedure inviting or permitting every citizen to present
himself to the voters on the ballot without some means of
measuring the seriousness of the candidate's desire and moti-
vation would make rational voter choices more difficult
because of the size of the ballot and hence would tend to im-
pede the electoral process.2
And with regard to voters, requirements of citizenship and
minimum age have long been considered reasonable.
Nonetheless, the type and severity of ballot restrictions adminis-
tered by the states and state parties have often become barriers to
participation for serious candidates, third parties and voters alike.
This Article will discuss a myriad of barriers facing candidates
and voters. Specifically, we will focus on major party presidential
primary ballot access requirements, minor party and independent
candidate barriers to the general election ballots, and barriers to
voter participation.
1. CANDIDATE BARRIERS IN STATE PRIMARY
BALLOT ACCESS REQUIREMENTS
A. Party and State Restrictions
As a matter of both constitutional doctrine and political
practice, Congress does not control candidates' access to state
presidential nominating convention delegations.4 Similarly, the
Democratic and Republican National Committees have only a few
very general guidelines that state parties must follow in delegate
selection, petition requirements, primary dates and filing
2. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974).
3. The Supreme Court has explicitly approved such voting restrictions for over 30
years. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (residency); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (minimum age); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621,
625 (1969) (citizenship). The United States Constitution was amended in 1971 to permit 18
year olds vote in federal elections.
4. The Constitution of the United States gives the federal government plenary power
to control the manner of general elections but does not detail the selection of candidates or
the administration of primary elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. However, the Supreme
Court has upheld federal regulation of state primary contests to the extent necessary to
protect the participation of racial minorities in the process. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536 (1927), Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), Smith v. Alwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) and
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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deadlines.' State law and state parties control access to the
presidential primary nominating process.' Some states issue
burdensome and costly requirements while other states impose
neither fees nor restrictive conditions.
During the nineteenth century, states selected candidates by
holding small closed-party meetings, or caucuses, which were made
up of party leaders, advocates or elected officials. At the start of
the twentieth century, caucuses were called into question in an at-
tempt to reduce the control political bosses exercised over their
parties.8 Caucuses not only excluded rank-and-file party members
from participating in the nomination selection process, but they
also allowed the party structure to retain more control over the
nominating process and the candidates who progressed beyond
the state level." Direct primary elections were developed in the Pro-
gressive Era (1890-1913) and succeeded in increasing civic
participation. As a result, primary elections generally began to
represent the choices of a wider segment of party members than
those of closed-party caucuses, where the nominee simply mirrored
the preferences of the party bosses."
Some states resisted moving from caucuses to direct primary
elections, and some have devised ingenious methods to retain
party influence. In Utah, for example, a party-endorsing conven-
tion selects the two leading candidates who will face off in the
5. See DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION RULES: FOR THE 2004 DE-
MOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, Rule 13 (2002) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter DNC RULES] REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., THE RULES OF
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, Rule 15 (July 31, 2000) [hereinafter RNC RULES], http://
www.rnc.org/gopinfo/rules/2000rulesl 1.15.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
6. Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot
Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2187 (2001).
7. Andrew Pierce, Regulating Our Mischievous Factions: Presidential Nominations and the
Law, 78 Ky. L.J. 311, 315 (1990).
8. BARBARA NORRANDER, SUPER TUESDAY: REGIONAL POLITICS & PRESIDENTIAL PRI-
MARIES 6 (1992).
9. Id. atll.
10. Id. atl11,111.
11. See NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATE-
GIES AND STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN POLITICS 43 (2000); John F. Bibby, State Party
Organizations: Coping and Adapting to Candidate-Centered Politics and Nationalization, in THE
PARTIES RESPOND: CHANGES IN AMERICAN PARTIES AND CAMPAIGNS, 23-24 (L. Sandy Maisel
ed., 1998). Caucuses were often convened by bosses without any formal notice and required
participants to make public (and therefore sanctionable) declarations as to who they were
supporting. See Leonard P. Stark, The Presidential Primary and Caucus Schedule: A Role for Federal
Regulation, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 333 (1996).
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primary election. If one candidate receives more than 70% of the
convention tally, a primary election is not held.
Endorsements by small state party conventions prior to the for-
mal primary election is another way state parties retain influence
and control in primary elections. These endorsements carry weight
with the party loyalists and benefit the party-favored candidate.
1 3
First, some states automatically place the endorsed candidate on
the ballot, while challengers must collect petition signatures and
pay filing fees with the parties. 4 Second, the favored candidate of-
ten receives the preferred position on the ballot. 5 Third, the
preferred candidate is sometimes publicly designated as the party-
favored candidate in the primary election through party leaders
publicly supporting that particular candidate."' These practices in-
crease the obstacles a challenger must overcome to win a party
nomination.
The procedures in New Hampshire and Virginia, two politically
critical states, reflect the range of primary access regulations and
two disparate philosophies regarding access. New Hampshire,
home of the nation's earliest presidential primary, requires a po-
tential candidate to pay only a $1,000 filing fee with the state and
does not require signed petitions. 17 New Hampshire Secretary of
State William H. Gardner has noted that the state "view[s] it as a
privilege to have the first presidential primary in the nation.... We
think we should make access to the ballot as easy as possible and let
the voters do the winnowing."
8
At the other end of the spectrum, Virginia's approach features
one of the nation's most rigorous presidential primary ballot access
requirements."9 Virginia limits access to the primary ballot to only
the most successful presidential candidates.2" In order to appear on
the ballot, the candidate must file a petition containing the signa-
tures of 10,000 registered voters, with a minimum of 400 from each
12. SARAH M. MOREHOUSE, THE GOVERNOR AS PARTY LEADER: CAMPAIGNING AND
GOVERNING 38 (1997).
13. See L. Sandy Maisel et al., The Continuing Importance of the Rules of the Game: Subpresi-
dential Nominations in 1994 and 1996, in THE PARTIES RESPOND, supra note 11, at 149.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Tyler Whitley, Getting on Ballot for Presidential Race is Difficult in Virginia, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH,Jan. 2, 2000, at C1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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of the eleven congressional districts in the state.2 ' Petition circula-
tors may only distribute petitions in their home districts or districts
directly adjacent. 22 In addition to this substantial signature re-
quirement, Virginia recommends a candidate go further and
gather between 15,000 and 20,000 signatures, representing a
minimum of 700 from each congressional district.2 3 This recom-
mendation is due to the relatively high number of petition
signatures that will prove invalid (i.e., signatures from individuals
not registered to vote) .4 The prospect of completing this petition,
with its significant monetary and man-power implications, can be
fatally daunting to prospective candidates. This requirement dis-
couraged former 2000 presidential hopeful Senator Orrin Hatch
(R-UT) from attempting to get on the Republican primary ballot-
even though the Senator had qualified for federal matching funds
by raising over $100,000 from individuals in more than twenty dif-
ferent states. 5
Virginia also effectively dissuades minor parties and their candi-
dates from participating in the election process. To qualify as a
party in Virginia, an organization must have received at least 10%
of the popular vote in the two most recent elections.26 The history
of the Reform Party illustrates the ongoing struggle that minor
parties face in gaining a position on the state's ballots. Having re-
ceived more than 10% of the vote in 1992 and 1994, the Reform
Party qualified for state recognition as a party in 1996.27 However,
in 1996, the Party only received slightly more than 6% of the vote
and lost its ballot certification.2 8 Thus, according to Virginia State
Code, the Party once again was required to gather the 10,000 peti-
tion signatures, including 400 signatures from each Congressional
district, to qualify its candidates for the 2000 ballot.29 And even
then, the Reform Party name will not be permitted to appear on
the ballot as a recognized state political party until its candidates
once again receive 10% of the popular vote in two consecutive
21. VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, CANDIDATE BULLETIN: BALLOT ACCESS RE-
QUIREMENTS: GENERAL ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT 3 (2000) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Whitley, supra note 17 at Cl.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-101 (Michie 2002).
27. Whitley, supra note 17 at Cl.
28. Id.
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-543 (Michie 2002).
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elections despite having met the petition and filing requirements
in earlier election cycles.30
Examples such as New Hampshire and Virginia shed light on the
widely disparate ways in which states treat candidates seeking a
place on their presidential primary ballots. In general, there are
four separate categories of potential requirements for candidates
seeking access: petitions, filing fees, media recognition and federal
matching funds. In discussing each of these categories, we will also
consider how these requirements differ for major, minor and in-
dependent party candidacies.
B. Petitions
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have complex stat-
utes regulating ballot access for primary contests. Twenty-seven
states require petition signatures from major party candidates.3
Compelling evidence of problems with the petition requirement
arose in New York during the presidential primaries of 1996 and
2000. New York is considered to have the most restrictive primary
ballot access requirements in the nation, requiring twice the num-
ber of petition signatures as the second most restrictive state,
Indiana.
In two cases in two consecutive presidential election years,
federal courts ruled that the New York GOP's requirements were
unconstitutional. In 1996, Republican businessman Steve Forbes
spent nearly a million dollars on 320 professional petition
circulators trying, unsuccessfully, to raise the necessary 37,000
signatures to qualify for New York's ballot in the Republican
presidential primary.3 The GOP rules required, among other
highly technical requirements, that candidates garner signatures
from 5% or 1,250, whichever is less, of enrolled party voters per
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-101 (Michie 2002).
31. The twenty-seven states requiring signatures are: Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, NewJersey, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. Twelve
states offer the option of paying a filing fee or collecting petition signatures. They are: Colo-
rado, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. SeeTable 2.
32. Persily, Candidates v. Parties, supra note 6, at 2202.
33. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp. 155, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter
Rockefeller fl], affd, 78 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996).
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congressional district, and that these petitions be notarized. 4 The
Democratic Party, on the other hand, required that candidates
collect only 0.5% or 1,000, whichever is less, of enrolled party
voters per district."5 Forbes and a group of Republican voters
brought suit against the GOP and the state in federal court,
alleging that the restrictive ballot rules burdened, inter alia, the
First Amendment right to vote. 36 The district court agreed, holding
that the state's ballot requirements were unnecessarily restrictive
and, in most cases, served no legitimate state interest.3 In the
ruling, the court asserted that these restrictive rules undermined
the very purpose of primaries:
Although at the primary all candidates are members of the
same party, they represent different political ideas and have
different qualifications for national and party leadership....
In politics, one challenges establishments in primaries, not
elections.... If discriminatory requirements prevent "inde-
pendent" candidates from obtaining the requisite number of
signatures to place on the ballot delegates pledged to them,
then the primary becomes little more than a state-sponsored
endorsement of the candidate of the party leadership.
3 8
In determining that the Republican Party's ballot requirements
imposed an undue burden on the voters of New York and on GOP
candidates, the court reasoned that because New York offered the
political parties two separate petition options-one for Republi-
cans, the other for Democrats-that "New York State has no
compelling interest in a more restrictive rule than 0.5% per con-
gressional district," the less rigorous Democratic standard.3 9 The
court went on to reject the notion that "particular interests of the
major parties can automatically be characterized as legitimate state
interests," especially when they only serve to "assure monolithic
control over its own members and supporters.,
40
34. Act of Aug. 28, 1995, 1995 N.Y. Laws 586, § 3.1 (6) (c). The Democratic and Repub-
lican Primary preferences for delegate selection are discussed in Rockefeller , 917 F. Supp. at
164.
35. See Rockefeller II, 917 E Supp. 155 at 164.
36. See id. The initial injunction against the GOP was made in Rockefeller v. Powers, 909
F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y 1995) [hereinafter Rockefeller 1], rev'd, 74 F.3d 1367 (2d Cir. 1995).
37. See Rockefeller 1, 909 F. Supp at 869.
38. Id. at 868-69 (internal citation omitted).
39. RockefellerII, 917 E Supp. at 164.
40. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 803 n.30 (1983)).
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Candidates in New York revisited these issues only four years
later. In 2000, Senator John McCain, a nationally recognized chal-
lenger to leading presidential candidate Governor George W.
Bush, struggled to meet even the revised, more lenient Republican
primary requirement of 1,000 or 0.5%, whichever is less, of all reg-
istered Republicans per congressional district (approximately
20,000 petition signatures total)." Of particular issue were two
technical regulations the GOP established for the 2000 primary
detailing how these petitions were to be collected. These provisions
required that petition circulators collect signatures from their own
congressional district only, and stated that Republican signatures
could be disqualified if the signatory listed her town instead of her
city of residence.4 2 The party rules required the McCain campaign
to gather the necessary 20,000 petition signatures within 37 days.43
These rules were perceived to benefit the state party-favored can-
didate, Bush, who could gather the necessary signatures in a short
period at party precinct meetings.44 Challengers, however, found
obtaining the necessary signatures over party opposition quite dif-
ficult.
45
The McCain campaign deployed 31 volunteer teams to gather
the petition signatures, but in the end, lacked the necessary num-
ber of signatures in 14 of the 31 state congressional districts and
did not qualify for the primary ballot.46 The McCain campaign's
state chairman and a group of McCain supporters brought suit
against New York and the state GOP, arguing, as Forbes had four
years earlier, that the party's ballot requirements were unreasona-
bly restrictive and violated the First Amendment rights of both
candidates and voters.4' The purpose and result of the New York
GOP rules, the McCain camp asserted, was to ensure that the state
party committee's favored candidate, Governor Bush, would be the
only candidate who could meet the requirements.
4
41. Act ofJune 29,1999, 1999 N.Y. Laws 137, § 3.1(6)(c).
42. See Persily, Candidates v. Paries, supra note 6, at 2204.
43. See Molinari v. Powers, 82 E Supp. 2d. 57, 70 (2000).
44. Id. at 62.
45. Id. at 70.
46. Press Release, Brennan Center, McCain Legal Team to Present Oral Arguments in
New York Ballot Access Case (Jan. 27, 2000), at http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/
releases_2000/pressrelease2000_0127.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
47. See Persily, Candidates v. Parties, supra note 6, at 2199-2206 (discussing the McCain
complaint and describing the undue burden placed on the McCain team).
48. See id.
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Again, the federal district court held that the state party re-
quirements imposed undue burdens on the candidate and voters,
and that the requirements were broader than necessary to satisfy
the party's asserted interest in eliminating unknown and unquali-
fied candidates from the ballot.49 The court also struck down two
technical petition-gathering requirements and agreed that the
GOP primary ballot requirements were crafted to severely burden
candidates like Senator McCain from participating and his sup-
porters from exercising their First Amendment right to vote.50
C. Filing Fees
States and parties commonly impose filing fees on candidates,
and the funds raised in this manner are often used to support vari-
ous electoral projects and party-building activities. 5' On occasion,
states and parties have imposed very high fees,52 and these re-
quirements-especially when fees for all 50 states are combined-
can be tremendously burdensome. Fees for the Republican and
Democratic primary ballots range from $200 in Pennsylvania to
$10,000 in Arkansas and South Carolina.53 In a number of states,
paying the filing fee can substitute for submitting signed petitions,
and vice versa.54 For example, Kansas requires either 1,000 signa-
tures or a $100 filing fee.55 This option enables candidates to save
precious resources for their campaigns.
49. See id. at 2200.
50. Molinari, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 71. Among the requirements the court found to be un-
duly burdensome were: the rule requiring that the collection of signatures must occur in a
period of 37 days from December through early January (a period characterized by few
hours of daylight and inclement weather, encompassing a number of holidays and a high
probability of school and family vacations); the rule prohibiting a voter from signing peti-
tions for more than one candidate, resulting in a "shrinking pool" of voters eligible to sign
petitions; rules as to the qualification of witnesses to signatures (the witness was required to
be a registered Republican voter residing in the same district as the signer, a notary public,
or a commissioner of deeds); the rule requiring each signatory to designate her city of resi-
dence, not her town; and rules concerning the presentation of signed petitions to election
officials. Id. at 70.
51. Mark P. Brown, Popularizing Ballot Access: The Front Door to Election Reform, 58 OHIo
ST. L.J. 1281, 1298 (1997).
52. See, e.g., id. at 1298-99.
53. See 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2872.1, 2873 (West 2003), ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-
201(5) (Michie 2003) and S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-40 (2002).
54. Brown, supra note 51, at 1286.
55. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4502(b) (2001).
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The courts have been instrumental in keeping filing fees low by
repeatedly striking down excessively high state primary filing fees
that may prevent a potential candidate from running for office."' In
a seminal filing fee case, Bullock v. Carter, the U.S. Supreme Court
reasoned that the rights of voters and candidates "do not lend
themselves to neat separation, "5' and that the burden imposed by
excessive fees falls not only on the candidates, but also on voters
whose right to vote is unconstitutionally minimized when states do
not offer the maximum number of primary candidate choices.
Two years later in Lubin v. Panish,59 an indigent candidate for the
county supervisor position in Los Angeles County was denied a
place on the primary ballot when he was unable to pay a filing
fee.6 0 The Court not only held that fees discriminate against poor
candidates, but that the "right to vote is 'heavily burdened' if that
vote may be cast only for one of two candidates in a primary elec-
tion at a time when other candidates are clamoring for a place on
the ballot."6'
D. Media Recognition Statutes
At last count, statutes in twelve states require the Secretary of
State or a selection committee, with the Secretary of State often
acting as chair, to place on the ballot only those presidential can-
didates generally recognized as candidates by the national and/or
local media. 2 These media recognition statutes have been attacked
by would-be candidates for being too vague and discriminatory and
have been challenged in the courts on numerous occasions, with
mixed results.
56. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
57. Id. at 143.
58. Id. See also Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judi-
cial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. Rev. 649, 669 (2002);
Persily, Candidates v. Parties, supra note 6 at 2188-89, 2194.
59. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
60. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. at 710.
61. Id. at 716 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968)).
62. The twelve states include: California, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee and Washington.
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6041 (Deering 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-465 (2003); IDAHO CODE
§ 34-732(1) (Michie 2003); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-502 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
53 § 70E (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.614a(1) (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-1089
(2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-614 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-56 (Michie 2002); OR. REV.
STAT. § 249.078 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-13-304(a) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 29.19.030(1) (2003).
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In a 1993 case, LaRouche v. Kezer,3 the Second Circuit upheld
Connecticut's media access provision as a substitute for petition
requirements on the grounds that it was not "wholly irrational."64
Yet in the 1992 case Duke v. Connell,6 5 a federal district court
ordered the plaintiff candidate to be placed on Rhode Island's
Republican Party primary ballot because the statute empowering
the Secretary of State to allow only "bona fide" candidates on the
primary ballot was vague and granted the Secretary of State
unchecked authority and discretion, in violation of the First
Amendment.
66
E. Federal Matching Funds
In 1966, Congress first codified public financing for presidential
elections to limit the financial burden campaigning creates for
candidates. 67 The sky-high costs of presidential campaigns make
this money an absolute necessity for most presidential candidates. s
Under the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),9 one way
to qualify for matching funds as a candidate is to raise $100,000 in
individual donations from at least 20 different states in sums of at
least $5,000 from each state. 70 A state may grant candidates auto-
matic ballot access if they have qualified for matching funds from
the federal government. In North Carolina, for example, a candi-
date must file either 10,000 signatures or show proof of qualifying
for federal matching funds.7'
63. 990 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1993).
64. LaRouche v. Kezer, 990 F.2d at 38.
65. 790 F. Supp. 50 (D.R.I. 1992).
66. Duke v. Connell, 790 F. Supp. at 54-55.
67. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, §§ 301-305,
80 Stat. 1539, 1587 (1966).
68. Direct presidential campaign expenditures more than tripled between 1956 and
1968, and almost tripled again between 1968 and 1980. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC.,
DOLLAR POLITICS? 92 (1982). Presidential campaign spending increased from an average of
$92.3 million in 1980 to $343.1 million in 2000. Center for Responsive Politics, Total Contribu-
tion to Psidential Candidates, at http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/index.asp?graph=
spending (last visited Apr. 9, 2003) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
69. Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88 Stat. 1297 (1974).
70. Federal Election Campaign Act, § 9033(b) (3)-(4). Note that no more than $250 of
any individual contribution is credited to the $5,000 amount necessary to qualify for match-
ing funds. Id.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-213.4, 163-213.5 (2002).
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Federal matching funds help equalize the playing field for major
party candidates-but the minimum fundraising requirement
tends to undermine minor party candidates and shut out inde-
pendent candidates altogether, as will be discussed below.
72
E Conclusion
As this section has detailed, states and state parties impose mul-
tiple procedural barriers that limit most major party candidates'
access to presidential primary ballots. Burdensome and technical
petition demands, high fees, media recognition and federal match-
ing fund requirements all limit a candidate's ability to assert her
candidacy, and consequently limit voter choice. Many of these pro-
cedural requirements are implicitly designed to favor the party
establishment's chosen candidate and undermine the candidacies
of all others. These tactics only serve to disenfranchise voters and
potential candidates-an outcome in which the party and the
party-favored candidate are the only beneficiaries.
II. OPEN PRIMARIES VS. CLOSED PRIMARIES
There are two main varieties of election systems that govern
primary elections. Open primaries are open to both party and non-
party registered voters.13 Closed primaries are limited to only regis-
tered party members.7 4 Some states opt for a semi-open system that
allows independent voters to participate in an otherwise closed
primary system. v5 Closed primaries serve the goals of the parties'
dominant insiders at the cost of public participation in the election
process, while open primaries may increase voter turnout and fa-
cilitate widespread public participation in the democratic process
by reaching out to minority party members and self-identified in-
dependents.76
72. In fact, no minor party candidate had ever met the fundraising requirements until
Ross Perot met them in 1996. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. Independent can-
didates are excluded by the Internal Revenue Code from receiving this benefit. See infra note
152 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Maisel, Rules of the Game, supra note 13 at 151.
74. See, e.g., id.
75. See Table 1 for a state-by-state primary system breakdown.
76. See Maisel, Rules of the Game, supra note 13 at 151-53.
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In the 2000 presidential primary elections, 16 states and the
District of Columbia conducted closed primaries and 33 states
conducted some version of open primaries (Hawaii does not have a
presidential primary election)." The states conducting open pri-
mary elections saw an unprecedented influx of voters. 7s According
to the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, the
2000 primary turnout was "aided by the large number of open ...
and semi-open ... primaries. GOP turnout was up substantially in
open and semi-open primaries, compared to the last competitive
Presidential primary in each state, while it was down in the closed
primaries., 79 South Carolina, for example, experienced record-
breaking turnout in the GOP primary, in substantial part because it
changed from a closed party system to an open party system and
altered its voting venues from party-chosen localities to the stan-
dard state polling places used in general elections."s
Truly open primary systems may encourage voter participation
and candidate competition. This principle was clearly reflected in
the 2000 election, when polls indicated that the candidacy of Sena-
tor John McCain, the Republican challenger to Governor George
W. Bush, was the main reason Republican voter turnout broke re-
cords in nine states.8' Those records had stood for more than 40
82years.
One available alternative is for states and state parties to conduct
primary elections wherein all registered voters may vote, but not all
votes will be counted toward a party's delegate selection. Prior to
2001, California maintained a blanket primary system under which
any registered voter could participate in the primary election and
selection of the state's presidential delegates. The statute was
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as a violation of a political
77. There are multiple variations of open and closed primaries that involve: Open
(Private Choice)-a voter receives each party's ballot and chooses which primary he or she
wants to participate in at the voting booth; Open (Public Declaration)-a voter must declare
which party ballot he or she wants to vote with on election day; and blanket primaries-a
voter receives one ballot which lists all candidates of every party affiliation. See Table 1; Fed-
eral Election Commission, Party Affiliation and Primary Voting in 2000, at http://
www.fec.gov/votregis/primaryvoting.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003) (on file with the Univer-
sity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
78. Press Release, Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, McCain,
Schedule, Open Primaries Propel GOP Turnout Sharply Higher; Democratic Turnout Low
(Mar. 9, 2000), at http://www.gspm.org/csae/cgansl0.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000).
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party's First Amendment right to freedom of assembly by forcing
parties to "adulterate their candidate selection process ... by open-
ing it up to persons wholly unaffiliated with the party. Such forced
association has the likely outcome.., of changing the parties' mes-
sage. We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's
associational freedom., 84 The blanket primary system was replaced
by a more closed-party system that still allows all registered voters
the opportunity to vote in the primary, but only allows registered
party members' votes to count toward party delegate selection.
Washington had a similar primary process in 2000 whereby unaf-
filiated individuals could cast their ballots for any candidate but
the political parties were not required to count the unaffiliated
voters' votes for the purpose of selecting the parties' delegates,
though these votes were tabulated as unaffiliated votes.86
Another discriminatory trend in primary elections evident in the
past two election cycles is "frontloading." State parties have pres-
sured the national parties to set their primary election windows (a
period of time in which a state party may select its delegates prior
to the national party convention) as early as possible so that their
state may be instrumental in selecting the party's general election
87
nominees. Frontloading of primaries puts independents and ma-
jor party challengers at a disadvantage by limiting candidacy to
those who are able to raise significant amounts of campaign funds
extremely early in the campaign cycle and who are able to qualify
for ballots up to a year in advance of the election.88 This has not
proven fatal to most presidential candidates, but imposes addi-
tional burdens on candidates who do not have their party's
financial and logistical support. In 1996, for example, frontloading
forced nine of the eleven Republican presidential candidates to file
for candidacy and begin campaigning before the summer of 1995
84. Id. at 581-582.
85. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6001, 6003 (a) (b) (West 2003).
86. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 434-219-250 (2000); Federal Election Commission, Party
Affiliation, supra note 77.
87. National party committees control the primary calendar and set state primary
election windows prior to the national nominating conventions. In 2000, the Democratic
National Committee's nominating window extended from the first Tuesday in March to the
second Tuesday in June. The DNC created an exception for the Iowa Caucus and the New
Hampshire primary, allowing them to be held even earlier. Republicans maintained an
earlier window in 2000 beginning with the first Monday in February and ending on the third
Tuesday in June with no exception for Iowa or New Hampshire. See Eric M. Appleman,
Democracy in Action: More Primaries, at http://www.gwu.edu/-action/chrnothp.htmnl (last
modified 2003) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
88. See Stark, supra note 11, at 349, 353.
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in order to start fundraising.9' The two exceptions, Morry Taylor
and Steve Forbes, relied on personal fortunes for campaign funds
and could therefore wait to announce their candidacy.' ° Further-
more, candidates must not only have a significant amount of cash
on hand to start the primary season, but must also have full-scale
state campaign organizations well ahead of the primary election in
order to qualify for the ballot in time for the election. 9'
Another consequence of frontloading is the effect it has on vot-
ers in states with later primaries. These voters invariably encounter
ballots with fewer candidates. 92 Candidates are whittled down as the
primary season presses on and candidates disfavored by the party
leadership drop out for lack of financial resources or successful
early primary races.93 Not surprisingly, voters' participation rates in
states with later primary election dates are low.
94
Frontloading also extends the general election campaign season
for months, discouraging candidates who want to enter the cam-
paign late in the season 9 5 and dramatically cutting into the time the
public has to scrutinize candidates prior to primary elections."O
The national political parties have perpetuated this problem by
approving earlier and earlier primary election and caucus windows.
The 2004 Democratic Rules provide that state Democratic prima-
ries may only occur between February 3 and June 8, 2004-
beginning a full month earlier than the 2000 primaries.9 The Re-
publican National Committee set out its 2004 primary rules
offering a window closely approximating that of the Democrats,
from February 3 to June 15, 2004.9' Because the DNC Rules create
an exception for the Iowa caucus and New Hampshire primary to
hold their primary activities earlier than the party-sanctioned win-
dow,99 and because both parties will hold primary elections to
begin in early February, a full month earlier than in the 2000 elec-
tion, the favored candidates will be decided even sooner and the
89. Id. at Table 6.
90. Id. at 348.
91. See supra notes 33, 36, 46, 48 and accompanying text.
92. See Stark, supra note 11, at 3 47 .
93. See POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 99.
94. Blaine Harden & Dan Balz, Compressed Primary Schedule Leaves Some Looking for Better
Way, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1996, at A6.
95. Stark, supra note 11, at 353.
96. Id. at 348.
97. DNC RULES, supra note 5, Rule 10(A). See also California Democratic Party v. Jones,
530 U.S. 567, 581-82 (2000) (comparison to 2000 primary windows).
98. RNC RULES, supra note 5, at R15(b) (11) (i). See also Jones, 530 U.S. at 581-82 (com-
parison to 2000 primary windows).
99. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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nominating convention will continue to be a coronation of the
chosen candidate.
III. CANDIDATE BARRIERS IN DELEGATE
SELECTION AND CONVENTIONS
A. State Delegate Selection
Much like the electoral college, the presidential nomination
process utilizes a state delegate system, whereby representatives
from each state pledge their support to the candidate assigned in
primary elections or delegate-selection caucuses at their quadren-
nial national conventions.'0 ° The two major parties' delegate
selection systems serve to exacerbate party leaders' control of the
presidential nomination process. The Democratic Party's propor-
tional allocation system tends to counteract these tendencies, but
only to a limited degree: the practice of using "superdelegates," or
delegates picked by the party leadership, serves to confirm the
party elites' choice.01 The Republican Party's rules, although not
explicitly favoring the party leadership's choice, may function in
practice to ratify the candidate with the party's financial and logis-
tical backing. '
Generally, all party delegates must be selected within a three-
month period prior to the national party convention. State dele-
gates are selected either by the party or by state primary, caucus,
and convention voters.' 3 if the party selects the delegates, candi-
dates generally propose their own delegates to the party.0 4 If the
delegates are elected, the public votes for the delegates typically
knowing each delegate's general preferences.
Party rules determine how delegates' votes are allotted. The
Democratic National Committee (DNC) has employed a nation-
wide rule mandating that each state's delegates be proportionally
divided among candidates so long as the candidates receive at least
15% of the congressional district or statewide primary vote.0 5' This
100. See generally POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 97.
101. Id. at 149.
102. Id. at 97.
103. For example, in 1988, approximately 64% of the delegates at the Democratic Na-
tional Convention were chosen in primaries, 15% were unelected "superdelegates," and
state and district conventions chose the other 20%. See id. at 142.
104. See POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 126.
105. DNC RULES, supra note 5, Rule 12(E).
[VOL 36:3
Barriers to Participation
allocation system gives primary challengers an opportunity to earn
delegates proportional to their primary success."' The DNC, how-
ever, reserves 20% of its entire delegation for party officials and
elected leaders. °7 These "superdelegates," as they are called, are
not bound to any candidate, but tend to support the candidate
preferred by the party leadership. °
The Republican National Committee (RNC), unlike the DNC,
does not set national guidelines on how delegates should be appor-
tioned. It allows each state to create its own method.'"9 In 2000,
57% of all Republican delegates were allocated on a winner-take-all
basis in twenty five state primaries and the District of Columbia." °
Republican delegates are also divided up among the state parties
by a formula that gives added weight to states that voted Republi-
can in the last presidential, congressional, or gubernatorial
elections."' This formula creates an incentive for presidential can-
didates to campaign more extensively in states that voted
Republican in previous elections, 2 although extra incentives seem
unnecessary because most candidates already have an incentive to
win in states that tend to vote Republican."1
The type of delegate allocation determines the type of candi-
dates the party supports. In a winner-take-all system of delegate
allocation, candidates with the strong support of small groups are
less likely to be successful because most party voters oppose
them." '4 On the other hand, the proportional allocation system
helps more extreme candidates because a premium is placed on
the intense commitments of candidate enthusiasts."5
106. POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 98-99.
107. Rhodes Cook.com, A Win is a Win is not a Win (2001), at http://
www.rhodescook.com/analysis/presidential primaries/national/delegateallocate.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2003) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
108. For example, in 1984 the superdelegates overwhelmingly supported Walter Mon-
dale early in the primary season, influencing his eventual nomination. See POLSBY &
WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 150.
109. See id. at 98.
110. See Richard E. Berg-Andersson, Republican Delegate Selection and Voter Eligibility, at
http://www.thegreenpapers.com/PCC/R-Del.html (last modified Dec. 26, 2000) (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
111. SeePOLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 98.
112. Id.
113. This is because the method of apportionment of Republican delegates to each
state gives extra weight to states that voted Republican in recent elections. POLSBY & WIL-
DAVSKY, supra note 11, at 98.
114. Id.at119.
115. Id.
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Courts have been reticent to interfere with the political parties'
methods of allocating delegates"6 in light of Supreme Court
precedent holding that state parties are usually not subject to judi-
cial review because they are not state actors"' and because it is a
political question."' Nevertheless, an individual may challenge a
national party's delegate selection process if the individual can
show that the national parties have a sufficient nexus to govern-
ment action." 9 In the case of delegate selection, national parties
rely on the presence and support of the state in carrying out elec-
tions. Thus, private action against national parties may be
permitted under the right circumstances.
20
B. National Party Conventions
The mid-twentieth century began with very robust and impor-
tant national conventions where party business was conducted and
nominating candidates was a competitive process.12 ' At the turn of
the 21st century, however, national conventions are no longer deci-
sion-making events; rather, they simply ratify the previous work of
the primaries and caucuses and launch a presidential candidate's
campaign on national television. 122 The formal business of approv-
ing platforms and putting candidate names before the convention
is addressed early in the afternoon, prior to the evening hours of
nomination speeches, advertisements, entertainment, and accep-
tance speeches.123 Not since 1972 for the Democrats and 1976 for
116. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mich. State Democratic Party, 593 F. Supp. 1033, 1045 (E.D.
Mich. 1984); Ferency v. Secretary of State, 362 N.W. 2d 743 (Mich. App. 1984).
117. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 483 n.4 (1975) (reserving question
whether national political party's selection of delegates to nominating convention amounts
to state action); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1972) (expressing "grave doubts" about
Court of Appeals' view that political parties' delegate selection methods constitute state
action).
118. See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. at 4 (raising the issue of whether political parties'
actions are unjusticiable as a political question but not deciding it); see also Kevin R.
Puvalowski, Immune From Review?: Threshold Issues in Section 1983 Challenges to the Delegate Selec-
tion Procedures of National Political Parties, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 409-11 (1993).
119. See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (articulating a two-
pronged test for state action: 1) whether the claimed deprivation has resulted from the ex-
ercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority; and 2) whether defendants
may be appropriately characterized as state actors).
120. See O'Brien, 409 U.S. at 14 n.7 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
121. See, e.g., POLSBY&WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 140.
122. Id. at 141.
123. Id.
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the Republicans has a national convention been the site of a con-
test over the presidential nomination for either party."4 The old
strategy of winning the presidential nomination by picking up last-
minute delegates at the convention is no longer viable. 2'
There are a few mechanisms that exist to counteract these
tendencies. The presidential matching funds system is one
example; the DNC's practice of proportionally allocating delegates
to primary candidates who receive over 15% of the primary vote is
another. The Republican Party, however, does not offer a similar
balance to counteract the ever-increasing certainty that one
presidential candidate will have the required delegate votes or that
all opposing candidates will have dropped out long before the
national convention.26
IV. MINOR PARTY AND INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE
BARRIERS TO BALLOTS
Minor party and independent candidates are-or ought to be-
an important means of presenting voters a wider spectrum of po-
litical choices. However, state election laws and major party
regulations burden legitimate minor and independent candidates,
augment the incumbent's advantage, and, as the Supreme Court
observed, perpetuates a "complete monopoly" by the two main
parties.
12 7
Since 1850, only two independents (John Anderson in 1980 and
Ross Perot in 1992) and eleven minor parties have received more
than 5% of the popular vote in a presidential election. Not one of
those eleven parties remained a force in American politics for
long. 2 Of the eleven, four dissolved prior to the next presidential
election, five continued to exist but received fewer popular votes,
and two merged with one of the major parties.19
124. NELSON W. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM 77 (1983).
125. See POLSBY & WLDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 119; see also Rhodes Cook.com, supra
note 107 ("Regardless of the different nominating rules ... there is a dynamic affecting both
parties that makes early defeats devastating. No candidate in either party in recent years has
mounted a successful comeback during the mop-up period.").
126. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
127. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
128. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, I GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 424 (John L. Moore et
al. eds., 4th ed. 2001).
129. Id.
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The court cases surrounding the troubled run of 1980 presiden-
tial candidate John B. Anderson reflect the disparity in treatment
of major and minor party candidates.13' Anderson was initially a
Republican primary candidate in 1980; in the spring of that year,
however, he dropped his party affiliation and ran as an Independ-
ent."'1 Anderson was denied access to the ballot as an independent
candidate in six states because the very early independent candi-
date deadlines had passed. 3 2 Anderson argued that in order to
compete with the major party candidates, an independent candi-
date had to declare candidacy and meet filing regulations more
than four months in advance of Republican or Democratic candi-
dates, and that this violated his First Amendment rights.
3 3
Anderson brought suit in six federal district courts and won in
each of them. 3 4 Eventually Anderson succeeded at appearing on
each of the 50 state presidential general ballots and received 7% of
the popular vote. 3-
A. Petition Gathering
A number of states impose onerous conditions on their petition
requirements, and these, too, have the effect of shutting out minor
party candidates. Twelve states require individuals who sign
petitions to attest that they are members of the party named on the
petition, that the voter will vote for the named candidate, or that
the voter will support the named party's candidate in another way
(contribute to or volunteer for the campaign, etc.). 3 6 Texas
130. See Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300
(4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 E Supp. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d
554 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898
(D.N.M. 1980); Greaves v. Mills, 497 E Supp. 283 (E.D. Ky. 1980), affd and revd in part,
Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730 (D. Me.
1980), affd mem., 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980).
131. Justices to Rule on Plea by Independent Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1982, at B7.
132. Anderson filed to be an Independent candidate in Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
New Mexico, North Carolina, and Ohio. See Morris, 636 F.2d 55 (Maryland); Babb, 632 F.2d
300 (North Carolina); Celebrezze, 499 F Supp. 121 (Ohio); Hooper, 664 F.2d 554 (New
Mexico); Greaves, 497 F Supp. 283 (Kentucky); Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730 (Maine).
133. Fred H. Perkins, Better Late Than Never: The John Anderson Cases and the Constitution-
ality of Filing Deadlines, 11 HorsTRA L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1983).
134. See Morris, 500 E Supp. 1095; Babb, 632 F.2d 300; Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121; Hooper,
498 E Supp. 898; Greaves, 497 F. Supp. 283; Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730.
135. Justices to Rule, supra note 131 at B7.
136. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6430 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3001 (1981);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 11-62(a) (2) (Supp. 1992); 10 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/10-2 (West 2002);
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required petition-signers to include their voter registration
numbers, which are given to voters when they certify their
eligibility to register.3 7 The Texas registration number statute has
been ruled unconstitutional and "unduly burdensome" for petition
signers and candidates alike. 38 However, the Texas election code
still states that in order for a signature on a petition to be valid, the
petition must include the signer's voter registration number.
Additionally, the Petition to Place Nominees on November General
Election Ballot provides a place for the voter registration number
with a small footnote indicating that including the voter
registration number is optional. 13 9 Most minor party candidates in
Texas must therefore resort to pursuing a write-in candidacy in
order to avoid this onerous requirement.
Multiple states prohibit individuals from signing independent
candidate petitions if the person votes in a major party primary.40
In West Virginia, for example, petitioners working for independent
candidates must advise signers that by signing they are forfeiting
their right to vote in a major party primary. Requirements such as
these deplete campaign treasuries and leave little funds for travel,
advertising and other means of placing a candidate's message be-
fore voters.
14 2
B. Filing Fees
Surprisingly, the states have less onerous filing fee requirements
for minor party and independent candidates. In a majority of
states, either no fee or a nominal fee is required, or the states offer
IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-6-5(5) (Michie Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-502
(2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-4 (West 1989); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-140 (McKinney 2002);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-96(6) (1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3517-011 (Anderson 1988);
OR. REV. STAT. § 249.732(1) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-2.5(2) (b) (1) (Supp. 1991).
137. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 141.063 (Vernon 1997).
138. Pilcher v. Rains, 683 F. Supp. 1130 (W.D. Tex. 1988); see also Texas Independent
Party v. Kirk, 84 F.3d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1996).
139. TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, PETITION TO PLACE NOMINEES ON NOVEMBER GEN-
ERAL ELECTION BALLOT (1997), at http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/cllpm.pdf
(last visitedJune 18, 2003).
140. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-341(c) (West 2002); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-
620(2) (1997); N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 6-138 (McKinney 2002); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 192.032(3)(f) (Vernon 1987); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-23(c) (Michie 2003).
141. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-23(c) (Michie 2003).
142. GLENN DAY, MINOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND PARTIES OF 1992: A REFERENCE
7 (1992).
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the option to submit signed petitions in place of the filing fee. 43
These options boost minor party candidates' chances of qualifying
for ballot access.
C. Federal Matching Funds
It is difficult for a minor party candidate to qualify for federal
matching funds. In fact, no minor party candidate had met the
conditions until 1996 when Reform Party candidate Ross Perot re-
ceived $29 million.'4
A minority party presidential candidate has two ways of qualify-
ing for federal matching funds. The candidate may qualify by
raising $100,000 from individuals in at least 20 states-the same
requirement asked of major party candidates.4 5 Alternatively, the
party may qualify for federal funds by receiving a minimum of 5%
of the popular vote in the preceding general election.1 46 This bar is
set too high, and excludes many worthy minor party candidates
from accessing the matching funds necessary to compete with well-
funded major party candidates.
The Reform Party presents another telling case study of the dif-
ficulty minor parties have obtaining these funds. The 2000 Reform
Party presidential candidate, Patrick Buchanan, qualified for $12.6
million in matching funds because of the 8.4% popular vote Ross
Perot had received in 1996 as the Reform Party candidate. 47 To
receive the funds, however, Buchanan had to certify to the Federal
Election Commission that he had qualified as a Reform Party can-
didate on more than ten states' ballots-a requirement neither the
Democratic nor Republican Party candidates were required to
meet. The Reform Party had a coordinated spending limit of
143. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-101 (Michie 2002).
144. Press Release, Federal Election Commission, FEC Certifies General Election
Public Funds for Buchanan-Foster Ticket (Sept. 14, 2000), at http://www.fec.gov/press/
buchgecert.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Refonn).
145. Ky Fullerton, Bush, Gore, and the Presidential Election: Time for the Electoral College to
Go, 80 OR. L. Rav. 717, 751 (2001).
146. Id. at 752.
147. Press Release, Federal Election Commission, Reform Party to Receive Public Fund-
ing for 2000 Convention (Nov. 22, 1999) [hereinafter FEC Reform Party Press Release), at
http://uww.fec.gov/press/refconv.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
148. Federal regulations espouse a restrictive definition of "candidate":
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$13.6 million (in addition to the $12.6 million in matching funds)
to spend on the party ticket, but in the end, Buchanan did not re-
ceive the 5% popular vote necessary to qualify the Reform Party for
matching funds in the 2004 presidential election.'49
The burden of a minor party candidate relying on the outcome
of the party's popular vote in the previous election undercuts the
candidate's current relevance and support in the election. It is an
unfair way to judge the viability of the candidate and has limited
the number of minor party candidates to a handful over the past
175 years. As mentioned previously, only 11 minor parties have re-
ceived the 5% necessary to receive matching funds.' 50 However, 39
minor parties have received at least 1% of the popular vote since
1824. 15' A lowering of the 5% threshold would increase participa-
tion of minor parties and their candidates.
The federal matching fund requirement automatically disquali-
fies and discriminates against all independent candidates without
party affiliation. The Internal Revenue Code states that "to be eli-
gible to receive payments ... a candidate shall certify to the
Commission that the candidate is seeking nomination by a political
party for election to the office of President of the United States.'
52
It is common for state statutes to stipulate that political parties
can be automatically placed on the state ballot for the general elec-
tion if they received a predetermined percentage of votes in the
previous general election. 1 3 This was the case in all but 16 states in
the 2000 election.1
54
For the purpose of this subchapter, "candidate" means with respect to any
presidential election, an individual who-(1) Has been nominated by a major party
for election to the office of President of the United States or the office of Vice
President of the United States; or (2) Has qualified or consented to have his or her
name appear on the general election ballot (or to have the names of electors
pledged to him or her on such ballot) as the candidate of a political party for
election to either such office in 10 or more States.
11 C.F.R. § 9002.2(a) (2003).
149. FEC Reform Party Press Release, supra note 147; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
supra note 128, at 688.
150. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. I.R.C. § 9033(b) (2) (2002) (emphasis added).
153. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-804 (West 2000) (requiring 5% of vote in pre-
vious election for automatic ballot access); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-101 (16)(A) (Michie 2000)
(requiring 3%).
154. All states but Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Maryland, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, West
Virginia, and WIyoming provided such access to the ballot. These sixteen states have no
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There are several negative consequences of the high require-
ments for matching funds and a state's willingness to automatically
put only those parties that qualify for such funds onto the ballot.
First, it limits the number of minor parties that can compete for
the Presidency. Second, a minor party and its candidate must work
even harder to meet the other ballot qualifications because they do
not automatically have access to the ballot. For example, if the
Green Party seeks to put a candidate on the 2004 ballot, because it
did not qualify for matching funds, it will have to collect upwards
of a quarter of a million signatures in Illinois, Texas, and California
alone--excluding the many other states that also require petitions
from a party that does not automatically receive ballot access by
qualifying for matching funds.
D. Media Recognition
Although media recognition is not a common criterion for a
minor party or independent candidate to access the general elec-
tion ballot, the amount of media attention a minor party candidate
receives makes a significant difference in the minor party candi-
date's ability to show her position on issues and gain public
support. The need for publicity is one reason that participating in
the traditional nonpartisan presidential debates sponsored by the
League of Women Voters has been such an important goal for mi-
nor party candidates. 55 Unfortunately, participation in those
debates remains an elusive brass ring.
The Commission on Presidential Debates sets the qualification
guidelines for the nationally televised presidential debates. 56 The
Commission has laid out new criteria for each recent presidential
election.5 7 In 1996, the Commission calculated the front page
newspaper coverage given to minor party candidates in compari-
statute that automatically places a political party on the ballot for receiving a predetermined
percentage of votes in a previous election.
155. See generally Press Release, Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), The Com-
promised Commission on Presidential Debates: Why Do TV Networks Allow it to Decide if
the Two Major Parties Will Face Competition? (2000), at http://www.fair.org/articles/
compromised-commission.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2003) (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform) [hereinafter FAIR Press Release].
156. COMM'N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES'
CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 2000 GENERAL ELECTION DEBATE PARTICIPATION, at
http://www.debates.org/pages/candsel.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (on file with the
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
157. See id.
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son with the coverage given to major party candidates. 5" The
Commission also tallied minor party candidates' attendance at ral-
lies and state campaigning events. 159 In 2000, the criteria also
included a requirement that a candidate have a statistical chance
of receiving an electoral majority and sizable public support, as de-
termined by public opinion firms. 160  No minor party or
independent candidates qualified to debate in 1996 and 2000, and
if the 2000 criteria of requiring at least 15% support in nationwide
public opinion polls had been applied to the three 1992 debates,
Ross Perot would have been excluded from the debates.
6
'
V. VOTERS: EXCESSIVE REQUIREMENTS AND
BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION
There are many barriers to candidate participation that also ad-
versely affect voters. For example, the United States is the only
Western nation that still follows the English tradition of making the
161citizen solely responsible for registration, with 25.6% of the
United States' eligible voters unregistered in 1996.163 Voter turnout
in the U.S. consistendy ranks poorly in comparison to that of other
democratic nations. 64 The most likely reason for our low voter
turnout is the significant, and unique, barriers to participation that
American voters face.
158. See COMM'N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES'
CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 1996 GENERAL ELECTION DEBATE PARTICIPATION, at
http://www.debates.org/pages/candsel.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
159. Id.
160. COMM'N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, CRITERIA FOR 2000 GENERAL ELECTION DE-
BATE PARTICIPATION, supra note 156.
161. FAIR Press Release, supra note 155.
162. Mark Quinlivan, One Person, One Vote Revisited: The Impending Necessity of Judicial In-
tervention in the Realm of Voter Registration, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2361, 2376 (1989).
163. See Federal Election Commission, National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-
1996 (1997), at http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
164. See Quinlivan, supra note 162, at 2376.
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A. Registration
Registration sometimes includes cumbersome regulations in-
cluding: excessively early deadlines; limited locations and
shortened hours of operation that make it difficult for full-time
workers to go to the central office to register; mandatory registra-
tion anew after any move; separate registration for federal and
state/local elections; and the chance of being removed from the
state records if a registered voter does not vote in a predetermined
number of elections. 6 5 Additionally, local registrars have discre-
tionary power to establish even more obligations.6 These multiple
obstacles lead to the well-founded proposition that registering to
vote is often more difficult than voting.1
7
Clearly this should not be the case. Initiatives such as the Motor
Voter Act, 68 which allows simultaneous voting and motor vehicle
registration, have been implemented in hopes of lessening voting
requirements and increasing turnout.
169
Registration is not a federal voting requirement; the states main-
tain discretion over which registration requirements, if any, will be
required. 70 However, the Courts and the federal government have
a history of invalidating state registration requirements that dis-
crimination against African American participation in the political
process, including nullifying grandfather clauses, poll taxes, "good
character" clauses, and literacy tests, as well as reversing gerryman-
dered districts produced by state legislatures.1
7
165. Id. at 2372-74.
167. Id. at 2374.
167. StevenJ. Rosenstone & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Effect of Registration Laws on Voter
Turnout, 72 AM. POL. ScI. RE-,. 22, 22 (1978).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994).
169. PIPPA NORRIS, DEMOCRATIC PHOENIX: REINVENTING POLITICAL ACTIVISM 80
(2002).
170. 2001 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:
ELECTIONS-PERSPECTIVES ON ACTIVITIES AND CHALLENGES ACROSS THE NATION 10 (2001)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
171. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (The Court invalidated so-called
"grandfather clauses"); The Constitution of the United States, Amendment XXIV, Section 1,
ratified January 23, 1964, abolished the poll tax as a measure for voter registration; a 1970
amendment to the Voting Act abolished literacy tests, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973, § 4; in Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) the Supreme Court held that state legislatures could not
gerrymander for purposes of discriminating against the right of African Americans to
register to vote; and in a series of cases, the Supreme Court ruled that all-white primary
elections were not constitutional (see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, (1927), United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 1944).
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The extent of registration requirements clearly correlates with
turnout rates, as can be seen through state-to-state comparisons.1
7
2
According to some experts, the voter turnout rate could be
boosted by 5% to 9% if all states had same-day registration rather
than markedly early registration deadlines.73 While twenty one
states and the District of Columbia allow registration by mail, this
registration method is a progressive exception and not the rule. 4
Registration deadlines range from no registration requirement at
175 16
all (North Dakota), to same-day registration, to registration 30
days in advance of an election. 77 North Dakota experienced 62%
voter turnout in the last election, in part because of its relaxed reg-
istration system.""
Unfortunately, several states and the District of Columbia con-
tinue to use excessively early registration deadlines which impede
voter turnout. 179 Typically, the number of voters paying attention to
specific elections and candidates increase as the election nears; but
in most jurisdictions, the point where interest peaks is long after
the local registration deadline has passed.' 80 Increasing the use of
same-day registration or adhering to shortened registration dead-
lines would encourage registration and participation in elections.1
8
'
Statistical data support this claim by showing that voter participa-
tion declined in the late nineteenth century as voter requirements
grew more stringent, 2 and currently, states with more relaxed reg-
istration standards have higher registration rates than the national
183
average.
172. See, e.g., Quinlivan, supra note 162, at 2363-64.
173. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, Legal, and
Socio-Economic Influences, in ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 11 (Rich-
ard Rose ed., 1980).
174. Quinlivan, supra note 162, at 2372.
175. Deborah S. James, Voter Registration: A Restriction on the Fundamental Right to Vote, 96
YALE LJ. 1615, 1615 (1987).
176. Three states (Maine, Minnesota and Wisconsin) allow same-day registration. Id.
177. Examples are: Texas (30 days prior to general election), Arkansas (30 days), South
Carolina (30 days), Florida (29), Alaska (30), Oregon (21), Arizona (29), New York (25),
Georgia (29). GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 70.
178. GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 54.
179. Quinlivan, supra note 162, at 2372.
180. See PoLsBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 22.
181. Improving Electoral Process: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and
Transp., 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (statement of Wade Henderson, Executive Director, Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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B. Procedural Barriers
On a procedural level, there are options available to local juris-
dictions to protect a citizen's right to vote. A provisional ballot is
one such tool utilized by some states. 184 Provisional ballots allow a
voter to vote on Election Day even if the registrar cannot locate the
voter's claimed registration, or if there is a difference between the
voter's address in identification documentation and the registrar's
records, or other such discrepancies.18 ' During the 2000 general
election, Florida voters who believed they were registered to vote
but did not appear in the registrar's records complained of being
turned away from the polling place after having been denied these
provisional ballots. 186 The absence of such ballots limits a voter's
access to the ballot in the face of faulty records, glaring mistakes
and other issues out of a voter's control. On that rationale, a provi-
sional ballot was written into the Florida code after the state's
187disastrous experience in the Bush/Gore race.
A second procedural restraint involves absentee ballots. Absen-
tee ballots were designed to allow an increased number of voters to
vote who might otherwise be engaged on election day.""' States vary
as to what an acceptable "excuse" for voting early might be. Juris-
dictions that narrowly define terms for absentee ballots decrease
the state's pool of voters. Nineteen states offer "no excuse" absen-
tee voting policies that enable voters to mail in their ballot without
having to offer a specific reason for doing so.190
184. States that have provisional ballots include California, Florida, Kansas, Maryland,
NewJersey, South Carolina and West Virginia. See National Conference of State Legislatures,
Provisional Ballots (July 2001), at http://www.elecfionline.org/site/docs/htnl/provisional_
ballots.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
185. According to the Florida state statutes, "a voter claiming to be properly registered
in the county and eligible to vote at the precinct in the election, but whose eligibility cannot
be determined, shall be entitled to vote a provisional ballot." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.048
(West 2002).
186. Press Release, Congressman Silvestre Reyes, Reyes Participates in Election Reform
Hearing (Feb. 27, 2001), at http://www.house.gov/reyes/prO0O227b.htm (last visited Apr.
17, 2003) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
187. Allison H. Eid, Symposium Overview: A Spotlight on Structure, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 911,
916 (2001).
188. See GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 12.
189. GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 104-05.
190. Id. at figure 22. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and most recently Florida, all have a no-excuse policy. Id.
Arkansas, North Carolina and Texas have a no-excuse policy to vote early but require an
excuse to vote by mail. Id.
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C. Disenfranchised Voter Sentiment
It stands to reason that voter turnout decreases when voters feel
that their votes are inconsequential.1 9 This would occur most often
when the outcome of an election appears so clearly predetermined
as to make the election a formality.1
92
In the 2000 primary election, the Republican turnout was ex-
tremely high-much higher than the Democratic primary
turnout.' 9 The reason for such high voter participation boiled
down to one factor: Senator John McCain presented a significant
threat to the party favorite George W. Bush in the Republican
presidential nomination. 114 Nine states experienced record level
voter turnout-the highest in forty years. Not since 1964, when a
similarly fierce competitor, the late Senator Barry Goldwater, chal-
lenged Henry Cabot Lodge for the Republican ticket, had the
Republican Party experienced such a high primary turnout. 96 In
states such as Iowa and Delaware, where McCain was not a candi-
date, turnout was lower.9 7 Competition in primaries plainly has a
positive effect on the interest and participation of voters in the
electoral process.
Another mental barrier involves the timing of presidential pri-
maries. In the 2000 primaries, the general election competitors
were more or less decided by the first major wave of primaries on
March 7th.98 The consequences of frontloading, as discussed ear-
lier, are evident in the significantly lower turnout of primary
elections held after March 7th.' 99
Voters continue to be discouraged from voting as a result of
many states' current voting regulations and procedures. Registra-
tion and mental barriers result in low voter turnout during each
election, while other democratic nations are able to attract higher
191. Harden & Balz, supra note 94, at A6.
192. Id.
193. Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, supra note 78.
194. Id.
195. Id. All but three states (Arizona, New York and Delaware) experienced an in-
creased Republican turnout. Id. New GOP Primary voter turnout records were set in New
Hampshire (26 %), South Carolina (19.3%), Washington (18.8%), Michigan (18.7%), Ver-
mont (17.8%), Ohio (16.3%), Virginia (12.6%), Missouri (11.6%), Georgia (10.9%),
Massachusetts (10.4%), Maine (9.8%), Maryland (9.5%) and Rhode Island (4.6%). Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Richard L. Berke, Gore and Bush Triumph Nationwide, Putting Nominations in their
Grasp, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at Al.
199. Appleman, supra note 87.
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percentages of eligible voters.20 0 Not only are many voting registra-
tion procedures confusing and elaborate but they differ widely
from state to state, making the process continually cumbersome for
citizens who move frequently.
201
CONCLUSION
A plethora of barriers tend to limit the participation of major
party candidates seeking to challenge the institutional favorite, the
participation of minor parties and independent candidates, and
the participation of voters. Heavy filing fees, unnecessarily high
signature petition requirements, and the inability to reach the me-
dia recognition status that would qualify candidates in many states
are all affecting the democracy in which we live. Relatedly, partici-
pation is low when few candidate options are available. Voters are
encouraged and motivated to participate by ideological challenges
internal and external to the parties. It should come as no surprise,
then, that in this electoral system that provides voters with limited
choices and sets up additional barriers to voter participation, turn-
out rates are among the lowest of democratic nations. The structure
of politics should encourage challenges to the established party ide-
ologies and not simply propagate a system whereby opportunities to
participate are denied to candidates, parties and voters alike.
200. Average voter turnout figures for other democracies include: Australia, 82.7%,
Austria, 79.6%, Bahamas, 67.6%, Barbados, 66.7%, Belgium, 84.1%, Botswana, 44.6%, Can-
ada, 60.1%, Colombia, 33.8%, Costa Rica, 81%, Denmark, 81.7%, Finland, 71.5%, France,
60.6%, Germany, 72.7%, Greece, 84.7%, Iceland, 88.3%, India, 60.1%, Ireland, 70.2%, Is-
rael, 83.2%, Italy, 90.2%, Jamaica, 46.4%, Japan, 57%, Luxembourg, 60.5%, Malta, 96.7%,
Mauritius, 79.8%, Netherlands, 75.2%, New Zealand, 80.4%, Norway, 75.7%, Papua New
Guinea, 72.4%, Portugal, 78.4%, Spain, 79%, Sweden, 82.6%, Switzerland, 37.7%, Trinidad
and Tobago, 68.8%, United Kingdom, 72.4%, and Venezuela, 49.9%. The average voter
turnout for the United States of America is 44.9%. International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 7trnout over Time: Advances and Retreats in Electoral Participa-
tion, at http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter-turnout-popl.cfm (last visited Apr. 17,
2003) (average voter turnout data for the 1990s). See generally AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF
DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIx COUNTRIES (1999) (an
in-depth study of the 36 established democracies, or democracies over 20 years old, listed
above).
201. Peverill Squire et al., Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 45,
51-57 (1987).
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